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Abstract
This paper discusses a series of Monte Carlo experiments designed to evaluate the empirical
properties of heterogeneous-agent macroeconomic models in the presence of sampling variability.
The calibration procedure leads to the welfare analysis being conducted with the wrong parame-
ters. The ability of the calibrated model to correctly predict the welfare changes induced by a set
of policy experiments is assessed. The results show that, for the economy and the policy reforms
under analysis, the model always predict the right sign of the welfare eﬀects. Quantitatively, the
maximum errors made in evaluating a policy change are very small for some reforms (in the order
of 0.05 percentage points), but bigger for others (in the order of 0.5 pp). Finally, having access
to better data, in terms of larger samples, does lead to sizable increases in the precision of the
welfare eﬀects estimates.
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11 Introduction
Fact: quantitative macroeconomics is a burgeoning ﬁeld. In this ﬁeld, Heterogenous-Agent (HA)
models have become a fruitful approach to conduct modern research in macroeconomics, as discussed in
Krusell and Smith (2006) and Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2009). The need to go beyond the
assumption of the representative agent for several important questions, Carroll (2000), the availability
of cheap computational power, the increased access to both cross-sectional and panel data, together
with a wider exposure of the profession to both numerical and recursive methods are among the
reasons why macroeconomics research is performed more often with the aid of a computer and with
household level heterogeneity.
The typical project starts by posing a well deﬁned economic question, develops a model ﬁrmly
grounded on microfoundations (speciﬁcally tailored to address the question at hand, particularly for
the role of heterogeneity), and numerically solves the model by implementing a calibration strategy.
Often the aim is to use the theory to quantify a variable that cannot be directly measured for, say,
lack of data (e.g. the extent of frictions in a market, as in Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson, and Sahin
(2010), or the nature of unobservable shocks, as in Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) and in
Guvenen (2007)). Another objective is to perform counterfactual analysis, by computing the welfare
eﬀects of a policy change together with its distributional impacts in an ex-ante policy evaluation, or
its optimal scheme, as in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) and in Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2009).
Ultimately, quantitative stochastic macroeconomic models are measurement devices. Important
and inﬂuential contributions relying on HA quantitative models have found, for example, that the
observed changes in the US wage structure led on average to welfare gains, Heathcote, Storesletten
and Violante (2010), that a theory of uninsured income risk accounts for the US earnings and wealth
inequality almost exactly, Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull (2003), that skill-biased techno-
logical change accounts for the evolution of wage inequality in the US, Heckman, Lochner and Taber
(1998), that the size of precautionary savings is modest, Aiyagari (1994), just like the welfare costs of
Business Cycles, Imrohoroglu (1989).1
These models are designed to quantify some variables of interest, being functions of a set of
empirical facts: the features of the data they are asked to replicate in the calibration stage. However,
little is known about their empirical properties, in particular their reliability as tools to perform
welfare analysis. As noted in the past in the Real Business Cycle literature, when the objective of the
computational experiment is empirical in nature, the calibration methodology is not free of potential
1This list is by no means exhaustive: it is just a subset of the several important contributions in the HA macro-
economic literature. In particular, since the analysis will be in a steady-state, models with aggregate uncertainty are
omitted. For a comprehensive survey see Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2009).
2pitfalls.2 On the one hand, relying on external estimates to pin down some of the parameters leads
to identiﬁcation issues, whenever the assumptions of the empirical methodology estimating those
parameters are not consistent with the ones of the macroeconomic model. On the other hand, sampling
variability can be an obstacle that could cast doubts on some of the ﬁndings. More precisely, in face
of sampling variability, it is not known how much the object of measurement is going to depend on
the tight requirement of asking the model to match exactly selected features of the data.3
This paper is going to deal with the latter aspect in a class of equilibrium HA economies.4 In order
to shed some light on the empirical properties of these models I am going to propose and perform a
Monte Carlo experiment. First, I am going to specify a simple HA economy. This is a version of the
Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) economies, appropriately modiﬁed to allow for some interesting
public policies and for a clear-cut calibration of key parameters. More in detail, the economy is going
to be a production economy with an endogenous asset distribution, where a government collects taxes
to ﬁnance both an unemployment beneﬁt scheme and public expenditure.
Agents are ex-ante identical, while they diﬀer ex-post, due to diﬀerent realizations of an exogenous
employment opportunity shock. This is a one-shock economy, where the sequence of shocks is inde-
pendently distributed among the agents, and follows a two-state Markov chain. This is an important
aspect, because the probabilities of the exogenous stochastic process do not depend on other para-
meters, and are uniquely identiﬁed: data on the unemployment rate and the unemployment duration
are suﬃcient to pin them down.
A baseline parameterization of the stochastic process, consistent with US and European labor
market outcomes, will be considered as the DGP. I will simulate the economy and I will draw 500
samples of diﬀerent sizes, namely 1,000, 4,000, 16,000, and 64,000 individuals.5 For each replication, a
sample with diﬀerent realizations of the employment opportunity shocks is drawn. This is going to lead
to non-degenerate distributions of two key moments: the unemployment rate and the unemployment
duration.
With these data in hand, I am going to follow Huggett (1993) strategy to calibrate the model
economy, solve it, compute the relevant endogenous variables, together with welfare measures under
both the current policy regime and under a policy change. The procedure is going to deliver sampling
2See Gregory and Smith (1990), Canova (1995), Hoover (1995), and Hansen and Heckman (1996), among others.
3These are among the reasons why carefully designed calibration exercises tend to provide some robustness checks,
by perturbing the benchmark parameters.
4The general idea is not new: almost two decades ago some authors, Gregory and Smith (1991), Watson (1993), and
Canova (1994), developed a set of methodologies to assess the empirical properties of RBC models.
5These artiﬁcial datasets are meant to mimic the size of the US datasets used more often by macroeconomists to
estimate/calibrate the stochastic processes driving the uncertainty in the model economy, such as the CPS, the NLSY,
and the PSID.
3distributions of the calibrated parameters and, more importantly, of the endogenous variables.
The contributions of this paper are several. First, to the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
Monte Carlo experiment dealing with equilibrium HA models. With this methodology it is possible
to assess the small sample properties of these models as measurement devices. This allows to gauge
some of their features as tools to conduct empirical analysis. Second, by varying the sample size
it is possible to see how the behavior of the relevant statistics changes, namely if there is a quick
convergence to the true values. Finally, ranges of estimates for the proposed policy changes are going
to be provided.
For the policy changes under analysis, I will be able to answer questions such as: How big is the
largest mistake due to sampling variability that a quantitative macroeconomist can incur into when
evaluating a policy change with these models? Is there a tendency for the distribution of welfare
eﬀects to become substantially more concentrated when the researcher has access to more precise
information (i.e. larger datasets, which lead to better calibrations)?
The most important ﬁnding is that, irrespective of the postulated DGP, the speciﬁc policy change
being examined, and the sample size in the Monte Carlo simulation, the calibration exercise never
fails in assessing the sign of the welfare change. In the presence of several policy changes, the answer
from the calibrated models has always proven to be of the right sign. This is true both for the welfare
enhancing cases and for the welfare reducing ones.
As for the magnitude of the welfare eﬀects, the results are less straightforward. Quantitatively,
when calibrating from the largest sample, the maximum errors made in evaluating a policy change are
relatively small for some reforms (in the order of ±3% of the true value), but bigger for others (in the
order of ±10% of the true value). Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a powerful rule-of-thumb
suggesting when we are going to be in presence of small mistakes and when of large ones. These errors
obviously get larger when considering smaller samples (in the worst cases considered here they get
above ±20% of the true value).
Moving from 1,000 to 64,000 sampled individuals does lead to a decrease in the dispersion of
the welfare eﬀects. The model and the implementation of the welfare comparisons are consistent
by construction: with knowledge of the ﬁxed parameters, a law of large numbers applies, there is a
unique stationary distribution, and a unique equilibrium. Hence, if we could sample an inﬁnite number
of agents for a long enough period of time, the calibration would deliver unique values for the free
parameters, and the results would collapse to the population ones, recovering the DGP. The Monte
Carlo experiments show that the distributions of welfare eﬀects become more and more concentrated
around the true values. However, the speed of convergence is faster in some experiments than in
others. Working with the wrong parameters triggers an endogenous response of the model, due to its
4GE nature, leading to changing aggregates, prices, distributional features and welfare measures. In
some experiments, this prevents the welfare eﬀects to converge quickly to their true values.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 is devoted to the description of the Monte Carlo experiment. Section 4 provides the main
results, while Section 5 concludes. Some appendices are also included: they discuss in more detail the
model and the numerical methods used. They also present additional results and a set of robustness
exercises.
2 The HA Economy
Time is discrete. The economy is populated by a measure one of inﬁnitely lived ex-ante identical
agents.6
2.1 Preferences
Agents’ preferences are assumed to be represented by a time separable utility function U(.). Agents’
utility is deﬁned over stochastic consumption sequences {ct}
∞
t=0: their aim is to choose how much to
consume (ct), and how much to save in an interest bearing asset (at+1) in each period of their lives,












where E0 represents the expectation operator over the employment opportunity shocks s ∈ S = {e,u}.




1−σ , that is the per period utility
function is strictly increasing, strictly concave, satisﬁes the Inada conditions, and has a CRRA= σ.
Notice that there is no direct disutility from work, hence labour supply is ﬁxed.7
2.2 Endowments
Agents can be employed (e), or unemployed (u). If employed, they earn a wage w and pay proportional
taxes (τu,τa,τw) to ﬁnance the unemployment beneﬁt scheme and the public expenditure G. If
6In the interest of space, I am going to present just a sketch of the model. For more details see Appendix A, Huggett
(1993), Aiyagari (1994), and Rios-Rull (1999).
7The analysis will focus on steady states, hence from now on we drop the time subscripts. Hereafter, the prime
symbol ￿ denotes future variables.
5unemployed, they collect unemployment beneﬁts, which are speciﬁed as a constant replacement rate
φ of the going wage, and pay proportional taxes (τa,τw).
The stochastic employment opportunities follow a two state ﬁrst order Markov process. The
transition function of the employment opportunity state is represented by the matrix Π(s￿,s) =
[π(i,j)], where each element π(i,j) is deﬁned as π(i,j) = Pr{st+1 = i|st = j}, i,j = {e, u}. Finally,
every agent is endowed with exogenous eﬃciency units denoted as ε, normalized to 1.
2.3 Technology
The production side of the model is modeled as a constant returns to scale technology of the Cobb-
Douglas form, which relies on aggregate capital K and labor L to produce the ﬁnal output Y .
Y = F(K,L) = KαL1−α.
Capital depreciates at the exogenous rate δ and ﬁrms hire capital and labor every period from
competitive markets. The ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm give the expressions for the net real return













Notice that the marginal productivity of labor is always positive, hence all the people with a
favorable employment shock are going to be employed. It follows that in the steady-state:
L =
π(e￿,u)
1 − π(e￿,e) + π(e￿,u)
.
2.4 Government
The role of the government in this economy is twofold.
On the one side it runs the Unemployment insurance (UI) beneﬁts scheme, by taxing the labor
income of the employed workers at rate τu and subsidising the unemployed workers at the replacement
rate φ. φ is a policy parameter exogenously given, while τu is set residually to ensure a self-ﬁnancing
scheme.
6On the other side, the government can carry out some public expenditure G. In order to ﬁnance
these purchases, both capital (τa) and labor (τw) taxes are levied. G and τa are going to be policy
parameters set exogenously, while labor taxes are set residually to guarantee a balanced budget.
2.5 Other market arrangements
The ﬁnal good market is competitive, and ﬁrms hire capital and labor every period from competitive
markets. Capital is supplied by rental ﬁrms that borrow from workers at the risk-free rate r and invest
in physical capital.
There are no state-contingent markets to insure against the unemployment risk, but workers can
self-insure by saving into the risk-free asset. The agents also face an exogenous borrowing limit,
denoted as b ≥ 0.
2.6 Discussion
Why the focus on this speciﬁc HA economy?
1. At its heart it represents the core of many richer HA economies, sharing with them similar
intertemporal trade-oﬀs, insurance motives, and distortions.
2. It is simple enough to be eﬃciently solved on a computer with an extremely high numerical
precision in a matter of minutes, allowing for a Monte Carlo experiment to be feasible.
3. It has a limited number of parameters, allowing for a neat calibration procedure.
4. The simple stochastic structure allows to solve numerically for the endogenous distributions
without relying on simulations of large samples of agents, which can lead to confounding eﬀects
in the welfare eﬀects computation.8
3 Design of the Monte Carlo Experiment
The Monte Carlo experiment consists of two steps.
8As shown in Michaelides and Ng (2000) in a Monte Carlo comparison of simulation estimators, exploiting the
numerical approximation of the invariant distribution rather than simulating samples of agents provides substantial
eﬃciency gains.
7In the ﬁrst step, I postulate the stochastic process for our economy and parameterize it to match
US data. I then solve the model economy and compute the welfare eﬀects arising from a set of policy
experiments. Coming from the DGP, these represent the true welfare eﬀects.
In the second step, relying on the true stochastic process, I simulate 500 samples of diﬀerent sizes
from it. This procedure generates a sequence of moments computed from the simulated samples. I then
re-calibrate the model’s parameters according to the simulated moments. With the new calibration,
I implement the same policy changes considered in the ﬁrst step and compute the welfare eﬀects
induced by the new policy regime. These will (most likely) diﬀer from the true ones, because of the
underlying parameterization being diﬀerent from the DGP. A crucial aspect, related to the reliability
of calibrated HA equilibrium models as empirical devices, will be how disperse the welfare eﬀects
estimates are going to be, and by how much they will diﬀer from the true ones.
I repeat these experiments four times (with samples of diﬀerent sizes, to consider the eﬀect of having
more data, namely of size n = 1,000, 4,000, 16,000, and 64,000), and perform some robustness checks
(with diﬀerent ﬁxed parameters, to check if these aﬀect the results).
3.1 Parameterization
3.1.1 DGP
The baseline DGP parameterization targets an unemployment rate of 9.4% and an average unemploy-
ment duration of 33.0 weeks. These are recent ﬁgures (as of December 2010) for the US labor market
and are broadly consistent with many European experiences.
In order to properly capture the labor market dynamics, I need to work with a short time period:
in the benchmark case, one model period corresponds to six months. In this case, π(e￿,e)DGP = .9182,
and π (e￿,u)DGP = .7879.9
3.1.2 Monte Carlo Simulations and Calibration
The HA economy under study has seven independent parameters: π(e￿,u),π(e￿,e),b,σ,β,α, and δ.
These parameters are divided into two categories. The ﬁrst two parameters, π(e￿,u) and π(e￿,e),
are "simulated", meaning that they are going to be recalibrated at each replication of the experiment,
9A previous version of the paper considered also a second DGP parameterization targeting long-run averages for the
US. For this alternative case the unemployment rate was 5.9%, the average unemployment duration was 19.0 weeks,
and the model was solved with a period being a quarter. The results were qualitatively very similar, and are not worth
reporting. The robustness checks with respect to two parameters, β and δ, were done mainly with this alternative DGP
speciﬁcation, which implied diﬀerent values for them, because the model was asked to match the same targets at the
annual frequency.
8on the basis of the speciﬁc results obtained in the sample simulation of the DGP. The ﬁve remaining
parameters are going to be kept ﬁxed. However, several robustness checks with respect to their values
are performed in order to understand if changing these parameters aﬀects the ﬁndings.
Notice that I limit the attention to calibrating only two parameters while ﬁxing the other ones.
With the information from the simulated samples the parameters I focus on are exactly and uniquely
identiﬁed and do not need the model solution to be assigned a value. The calibration procedure would
be substantially more complex if I were to allow for richer simulations (i.e. more moments) and less
ﬁxed parameters (which would need to be calibrated in equilibrium, increasing the computational
time by orders of magnitude, requiring the use of super-computers).10
3.1.3 "Simulated" Parameters
The parameters driving the uncertainty in the economy are going to be assigned many diﬀerent values,
one for each replication of the simulated sample. The two independent probabilities representing the
Markov chain for the employment opportunities, π(e￿,e) and π (e￿,u), are going to be re-calibrated





π(e￿,e)m = 1 − π(e￿,u)m ∗
￿
U ratem
1 − U ratem
￿
(4)
where "U durationm" stands for the average unemployment duration computed in the simulated
sample m, while "U ratem" stands for the corresponding simulated unemployment rate.
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
Figures (1) and (2) show the distribution of the two parameters resulting from the calibration
procedure. Figure (1) presents the non-parametric kernel estimate of four densities (one for each
sample size in the simulation stage) of the job ﬁnding probability π (e￿,u). These are computed relying
on equation (3). Figure (2) presents a similar graph for the job retention probability π (e￿,e), computed
relying on equation (4). As expected, sampling more individuals from the true stochastic process leads
to more precise estimates of both the unemployment rate and the unemployment duration. These, in
10Although conceptually feasible, matching the simulated labor shares, investment rates, and capital-output ratios
would require reliable data on the value of asset holdings, a type of information which is usually hard to get in real
household level panel data. At the same time, this alternative procedure would lead to several parameters changing at
once, taking several hours per replication, and making the interpretation of the results less transparent.
9turn, lead to more concentrated distributions of the job ﬁnding and job retention probabilities. The
rate of convergence is
√
n, which visually can be seen by moving from one panel to the next, with the
estimated densities doubling their maximum value.
[Table 1 about here]
Table (1) provides a set of descriptive statistics for the two Markov chain probabilities. It is worth
stressing that the parameters’ range used to solve the model and compute the related welfare eﬀects
is quite large. As for π(e￿,e), with only 1,000 observations at our disposal this parameter ranges from
0.8545 to 0.9583. This is even more so for the other parameter in the Markov chain, the job ﬁnding
probability π(e￿,u). In the 1,000 observations case this parameter ranges from 0.5137 to 1.0. As
a consequence, the amount of idiosyncratic uncertainty in the economy varies substantially, getting
less disperse with larger samples. With 64,000 artiﬁcial observations π(e￿,e) ranges from 0.9113 to
0.9244, while π(e￿,u) ranges from 0.7525 to 0.8355. Notice how the median values are always very
close to the DGP, irrespective of the sample size.
3.1.4 Fixed Parameters
The concavity of the utility function is pinned down by the CRRA coeﬃcient σ, which is set to 1.5, a
common value in the literature. In the robustness checks I will set σ to 1.0 (i.e. log utility) and 2.0,
instead.
The borrowing limit b is set to three diﬀerent values, all strictly lower than the natural borrowing
limit. In the benchmark economy b = 4. This means that the agents can borrow up to (almost) two
model period average income. With this limit, 8.8% of the households are in debt, a value consistent
with the SCF data, reported for example by Cagetti and De Nardi (2008). Other experiments rely on
b = 0 and b = 2.
The capital depreciation rate is set to replicate an investment/output ratio of approximately 22.5%.
This is achieved with δ = 0.04. With a Cobb-Douglas production function the capital share is captured
by the parameter α = 0.34, which matches the capital share of income. The rate of time preference
β is calibrated to get an equilibrium interest rate of approximately 4% on an annual basis, obtained
when β = 0.97979589.
The complete parameterization of the model is reported in Table (2).
[Table 2 about here]
103.1.5 Policy Parameters
Diﬀerently from the parameters above, φ,τa, and G are policy parameters. They are pinned down
by the institutional features of the economy they are meant to represent (its labor market and ﬁscal
policies, in particular). Their values are reported in Table (3), and will be explained in detail in the
policy experiments description.
[Table 3 about here]
3.2 Model Solution and Policy Changes
For each set of calibrated parameters the equilibrium of the model is computed twice. The ﬁrst time
under the current policy regime, i.e. for speciﬁc values of the triplet {τa,G,φ}, the second time under
the counterfactual economy, i.e. after a policy change.11
The policy changes that I consider fall into two broad categories. The ﬁrst experiment is going to
deal with a reduction in the generosity of the UI scheme. This is meant to highlight the insurance
properties of this policy and the endogenous response of precautionary savings. The second experiment
is going to deal with a reduction in capital income taxation. This is meant to highlight the distortionary
eﬀects of capital taxation and the endogenous response of savings.12
It is important to stress that this paper does not deal primarily with the optimality of the UI
program, as in Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), or the actual desirability of changing the current
capital tax code, as in Ventura (1999). It is mainly targeted at assessing the empirical properties of
the underlying quantitave macroeconomic HA model.
Moreover, notice that in the numerical solution of the model there is no sampling variability (due
for example to Monte Carlo integration). The only sources of error are the numerical errors induced
by the discretization of the state space and by the convergence criteria, which are kept as small as
11The welfare eﬀects are going to compare two diﬀerent steady-states. I consider both the percentage change in
aggregate welfare, and a consumption equivalent welfare measure, while I don’t consider transitional dynamics. See
equations (11) and (12) in Appendix A.
12In the experiments, I consider both a big change in capital taxation and in the UI beneﬁt. An alternative, and
perhaps more informative, exercise could have been to consider their elimination. However, in the model I am preventing
agents to react to such changes through relevant margins. Agents cannot change their labor supply (taxes on labor
increase as a consequence of the decreased capital taxes), and they can’t put more eﬀort while searching for a job (in the
UI experiment). Although admittedly important, these extensions would increase substantially both the computational
burden and the likelihood of the algorithm failing to converge for some calibrations. These complications could make
the Monte Carlo experiment quite intractable.
11the computational burden makes possible. It follows that, across replications, the computed equilibria
vary only because of the diﬀerent calibrated parameters. Diﬀerently, the change in equilibria would
partially reﬂect the simulation error: aggregate quantities would vary randomly, leading to an induced
endogenous response of the model and an additional source of error for the welfare eﬀects.13
3.3 Experiment 1 - UI
For this experiment I assume that the only public policy in place in the economy is the UI. Unexpect-
edly, the government implements a cut in the replacement rate φ : φ = 0.5 in the benchmark economy
and φ
new = 0.25 in the counterfactual one.
The economics of this policy change are very simple. With a lower φ, agents are less insured
against their idiosyncratic shocks. A priori we cannot say if the policy reform is going to lead to a
welfare gain or to a welfare loss. Income during an unemployment spell decreases, making it more
diﬃcult for agents to achieve consumption smoothing. However, quantitatively, this reform leads to
an aggregate welfare increase. This is due to the ability of agents to self-insure by accumulating more
assets: capital supply increases, because of the increased precautionary savings. At the same time
employed agents pay less taxes, and are going to consume part of these resources. Overall, this leads
unemployed agents to be worse oﬀ in the new steady-state, while employed ones are better oﬀ.
The unemployment rate in the economy is kept constant, hence the capital demand schedule does
not change and we are just moving along the curve. A higher capital supply is going to trigger a
decrease in the interest rate clearing the asset market, leading to: a) a larger capital stock, b) higher
wages and a lower decrease in the UI beneﬁts, c) cheaper borrowing, d) a lower return on savings. The
last two eﬀects imply that some agents could start substituting away from saving and consuming more,
with some borrowing more. However, in the aggregate, these shifts are dominated by the increased
precautionary saving motive.
Overall, together with the larger relative size of employed agents, this explains why there is a
welfare gain when the unemployment beneﬁts are reduced.
3.3.1 Case 1a)
For this case G = τa = τw = 0, φ = 0.5 and φ
new = 0.25.14
13This is why I don’t consider a stochastic process for wages, as in Aiyagari (1994). The approximation procedures
typically used to solve that model introduce a source of error that I can dispense of with this alternative and simpler
speciﬁcation. For more details on the numerical solution, see Appendices B and C.
14Taxes react to the new regime, and their new equilibrium value decreases to τu =
φnew(1−L)
L . See equation (7) in
appendix A.
12The true welfare eﬀect for this case is quantiﬁed in a 0.556% increase of the average steady-state
utility. Employed agents enjoy a 0.667% welfare increase, while unemployed ones suﬀer a 0.528%
welfare loss. The corresponding ﬁgures for the consumption equivalent welfare measure are a 1.104%
increase for the overall economy, a 1.320% increase for employed agents, and a 1.064% decrease for
the unemployed ones.
3.3.2 Case 1b)
In case 1b I consider the same set-up as in case 1a. The only diﬀerence stems from a tighter borrowing
limit: b is decreased from b = 4 to b = 0. Agents in this economy cannot borrow at all, hence it becomes
more diﬃcult for them to smooth consumption.
Irrespective of the more stringent borrowing limit, the true average welfare eﬀect for this case
does not change much compared to the previous one. It is now quantiﬁed in a 0.370% increase of
the average steady-state utility. A slightly lower improvement in welfare is obtained because of the
lower impact of precautionary savings, and the greater utility loss of the unemployed. Due to the
stricter b, agents in this economy are saving more than in case 1a: the same change in φ leads to a
response of savings which is proportionally lower. The capital stock does not increase as much as in
case 1a, implying a lower increase in welfare. Employed agents enjoy a 0.478% welfare increase, while
unemployed ones suﬀer a 0.699% welfare loss. Due to their inability to borrow, an income cut proves to
be even more detrimental for these agents. The corresponding ﬁgures for the consumption equivalent
welfare measure are a 0.735% increase for the overall economy, a 0.950% increase for employed agents,
and 1.413% decrease for the unemployed.
3.3.3 Welfare Eﬀects Sampling Distributions
Figures (3) and (6) plot the non-parametric kernel density estimates of the economy-wide welfare
eﬀects obtained in the four Monte Carlo experiments (with diﬀerent sample sizes) for the cases 1a and
1b.
[Figures (3) and (6) about here]
A few features of the plots are worth stressing. The distributions are almost centered around the
true values. Moreover, when moving from the top left panel (n = 1,000) to the bottom right one
(n = 64,000), the dispersion of the welfare eﬀect estimates gets smaller. The more people are sampled,
the tighter the calibration, and the less imprecise the welfare eﬀects estimates. However, the rate of
convergence is not close to the rate of convergence of the parameters, and seems to be happening very
13slowly for case 1b. The endogenous response of the model, when working with parameters diﬀerent
from the true ones, seems to be preventing a rapid convergence of the welfare eﬀects. When the true
welfare eﬀects are quantitatively very small, as in case 1b, even small diﬀerences in the computed
equilibria involve a non-negligible impact on the welfare eﬀects.
The welfare analysis can be broken down for two subgroups, the employed and the unemployed
agents. The related plots for case 1a are shown in Figures (4) and (5). Compared to the overall
economy-wide welfare eﬀects it is possible to appreciate some diﬀerences. The welfare eﬀects of
the unemployed can be very imprecise when working with small samples, but they show a rate of
convergence which is very fast and closer in magnitude to the parameters’ one.15 As for the employed
agents, the same observations seem to hold, but less strongly. The errors made with very limited
sample sizes are less extreme, but they tend to improve at a lower rate.
[Figures (4) and (5) about here]
Finally, for these economies, studying the welfare eﬀects directly in terms of the average steady
state utility change vis-à-vis a consumption based welfare measure turns out to be immaterial. When
considering the latter, there is just a level eﬀect, with the shape of the distributions and the convergence
behavior being identical.16
3.4 Experiment 2 - Capital Taxation and Public Expenditure
The second experiment deals with a change in the tax code, starting from a very distortionary capital
income taxation τa. An analogous policy reform is studied in a similar economy by Imrohoroglu
(1998).
There is an exogenously given public expenditure G, which needs to be ﬁnanced by collecting taxes
on capital and labor income. G and τa are set by a policy maker, while τw is set residually to ensure
a balanced budget.
In the initial policy regime capital income is heavily taxed. This leads agents to save little, as the
after-tax rate of return is low. On the other hand, labor supply is inelastic, so taxing labor does not
imply any distortions. Agents cannot reduce their labor supply and do not accumulate human capital
while on the job. Unexpectedly, the government implements a budget neutral tax cut: τa = 0.3 in
15This ﬁnding provides evidence that the slow convergence of the welfare eﬀects for the employed agents and for the
overall economy is a genuine result. The numerical error could have been behind those behaviors.
16For example, compare Figure (3) to Figure (9) in Appendix D.
14the benchmark economy and τnew
a = 0.2 in the counterfactual one. This simple case implies that, for
a given level of publc expenditure, lower capital taxes are going to increase the incentives to save,
leading to a larger capital stock, and higher wages. Overall this explains why there is a welfare gain
from reducing the capital tax, even though a priori the policy reform could lead to a welfare loss (labor
income is going to be taxed more, hence unemployment spells might become less attractive).
Finally, notice that for these experiments the UI scheme is kept at its benchmark speciﬁcation,
and the borrowing limit is set to b = 0, to avoid capital income taxes turning into subsidies for agents
in debt.
3.4.1 Case 2a)
For this case φ = 0.5, τa = 0.3,τnew
a = 0.2 and G = G = 0.42. This value of G matches the Public
Expenditure/Output ratio in the initial steady-state, which is approximately 20%.
For a given (and constant) public expenditure, a decrease in capital taxes τa mechanically leads
to an increase in labor taxes τw.17 However, labor supply is rigid in this economy and we are getting
closer to the principles of Ramsey taxation: higher taxes should be set for the goods with lower
elasticities of substitution. Notice also that the decrease in distortionary taxation has a GE eﬀect as
well: a higher return on capital increases savings and investment, leading to a higher output and a
lower interest rate.
It follows from these considerations that in the counterfactual economy the government share of
output is no longer going to be at a constant value of 20%, and in the ﬁnal steady-state it will account
for a lower share.
As expected, the true welfare eﬀect for this case is sizable, and it is quantiﬁed in a 8.415% increase of
the average steady-state utility. Unlike in the ﬁrst policy change, both the employed and unemployed
agents enjoy a welfare gain, equal to 8.363% and to 8.939% respectively. The increased capital supply
raises output, wages, and the unemployment beneﬁts, which more than compensate the increased
taxation of labor earnings. The corresponding ﬁgures for the consumption equivalent welfare measure
are stunning: the increases are 14.921% for the overall economy, a 14.840% increase for employed
agents, and 15.737% for the unemployed ones.
3.4.2 Case 2b)
For this case φ = 0.5, τa = 0.3,τnew
a = 0.2 and G
Y = G
Y = 0.2.





in the counterfactual economy
is kept always constant at 20%. This means that, after the decrease in the capital tax, output will
17See equation (8) in Appendix A.
15increase, and so will the public expenditure. Compared to case 2a, there are now less resources left
for both private consumption and investment. This explains why the welfare gains turn out to be
substantially lower.
The true welfare eﬀect for this case is quantiﬁed in a 3.645% increase of the average steady-state
utility, with the increase for the employed being 3.619%, and for the unemployed being 3.909%. The
consumption based welfare measures are now 6.910%, 6.864% and 7.383%.
3.4.3 Welfare Eﬀects Sampling Distributions
Figures (7) and (8) plot the non-parametric kernel densities of the welfare eﬀects obtained in the four
Monte Carlo experiments for the cases 2a and 2b.
[Figures (7), and (8) about here]
The tax experiments diﬀer from the UI ones in some aspects. First, the economy-wide welfare
eﬀects of the capital tax reforms are converging at a fast rate to their true value, in case 2a in
particular. Second, for this policy reform breaking down the welfare analysis into the employed and
the unemployed agents does not show any diﬀerence from the patterns of the economy-wide welfare
gains. They both track the overall welfare eﬀect closely, being just a shift to the right or to the left
of the economy-wide distributions. Third, both groups of workers always enjoy a welfare gain.
The top left panels of the two ﬁgures (referring to n = 1,000) show that a small sample and
an extreme calibration can lead to relatively large mistakes in the assessment of aggregate welfare.
Diﬀerently, the bottom right panels (referring to n = 64,000) show that the welfare eﬀect distributions
are very concentrated around their true value.
4 Estimating Welfare Eﬀects with a Calibrated HA Model
What happens to the estimated welfare eﬀects obtained from the Monte Carlo experiments? In general,
working with a calibrated model with parameters that diﬀer from the true ones leads to errors that
many would consider tolerable. Table (4) reports several statistics of the economy-wide welfare eﬀects
computed in each experiment.18
18Tables (5) and (6) in Appendix D provide the same statistics for the employed and the unemployed agents. The
main comments apply also to these group speciﬁc welfare eﬀects.
16[Table 4 about here]
The calibrated HA model always got the right sign of the welfare eﬀects. Irrespective of the policy
experiment considered, the alternative calibrations of the ﬁxed parameters, and the data abundance,
the quantiﬁed welfare eﬀects were always of the same sign as the true ones.
Another positive, but perhaps not surprising, aspect is that the range of the welfare eﬀects decreases
monotonically with the sample size. For example, for case 1a, it moves from [0.453,0.629] in the least
precise case to [0.508,0.594] in the most precise one. Both the upper bound and the lower bound of
the welfare eﬀects support are shrinking considerably with the sample size.
An implication of this behavior is that the maximum error that we could incur into when evaluating
the welfare eﬀects of a policy change decreases with the quantity of the information at our disposal.
In the ﬁrst experiment the maximum error never exceeds 0.103 percentage points, and (in absolute
value) it ranges between 6.83% and 18.52% of the true value. In experiment 1b, the maximum error
never exceeds 0.062 percentage points, and it ranges between 9.73% and 16.76% of the true value.
The capital tax experiments show larger errors, because the underlying true values are substiantially
higher. The maximum error never exceeds 3.253 percentage points for case 2a, and 0.681 percentage
points for case 2b. The range of the maximum error is between 3.29% and 38.66% of the true value
for the former, and between 3.79% and 18.68% for the latter.
The means and medians of each Monte Carlo experiment are remarkably close to the corresponding
true values. If we consider the model as an estimator for the welfare eﬀects, it displays a small sample
bias that does not seem to have a regular pattern with the sample size. Hence, the average of
the welfare eﬀects sampling distribution does not coincide with the true eﬀect. The bias, though, is
quantitatively negligible for all possible experiments. This result seems to suggest that a well designed
sensitivity analysis can go a long way in quantifying a reliable estimate of an ex-ante policy evaluation.
Very similar considerations apply for all the cases considered. This implies that, irrespective of
the size and sign of the true welfare eﬀects, a quantitatively negligible small sample bias is going to
be always present, and that more information makes large mistakes to become less and less likely.
The main diﬀerences in the experiments under analysis consist of the rate at which the welfare
eﬀects distributions converge to their true values. In cases 1a and 1b the sampling distributions show
a very slow rate of convergence, unlike cases 2a and 2b, which seems to be collapsing to their true
values at quite a fast rate. The welfare eﬀects sampling distributions do get more concentrated around
the true value, but the speed of convergence is often far from what is observed for the Markov Chain
probabilities.
175 Discussion and Conclusions
Fifteen years ago, in their survey on computational experiments in macroeconomics, Hansen and
Heckman (1996) argued that equilibrium HA models represented a potential solution to some of the
problems inherent in the calibration methodology. In this paper I performed a Monte Carlo experiment
for a class of HA economies. The general idea is to evaluate some of the properties of equilibrium
HA models as tools to perform empirical research. More precisely, I focused on the misspeciﬁcations
of the model due to sampling variability in the moments that the calibration methodology aims at
matching.
This paper does not claim to have provided the ﬁnal word on the matter. However, as a ﬁrst
assessment, the ﬁndings seem to be encouraging: 1) in the simulations, for all possible parameter
conﬁgurations and policy changes, the quantiﬁed measure of the welfare change is always of the right
sign; 2) for many parameter conﬁgurations and policy changes the distribution of welfare eﬀects are
quite concentrated around the true value, leading to what many would consider tolerable errors when
evaluating the eﬀects of a policy change.
On a less bright note, in some experiments, the welfare eﬀects were less concentrated, leading to a
maximum error as big as 38.6% of the true value. However, mistakes as extreme as this one seemed to
be rare, with the [5%,15%] interval being the most common range, even with only 1,000 observations.
For some experiments, the distribution of welfare eﬀects shows a fast convergence to the true value
when increasing the sample size (hence the quality of the calibration). While for other experiments
the rate of convergence appeared to be slow.
Rather than fully specifying the DGP and creating artiﬁcial samples from it, I could have considered
real data from, say, the CPS for one or several years, bootstrap the sample, calibrate and solve the
model. Although the statistical foundations of bootstrapping are diﬀerent, I believe that I would have
obtained similar results, at least qualitatively. The advantage of the fully speciﬁed DGP approach is
that it provides a natural benchmark comparison: by design, I know how far each replication is from
the true model, and from the true welfare eﬀects. With a bootstrapping experiment I would still be
able to compute, for example, bounds for the welfare gains. However, I would not be able to assess
how far these computations are from the true value, whenever I rely on parameters that are not the
true ones. That is, I would not be able to tell how the endogenous response of the model to parameter
mispeciﬁcations "confounds" the estimates of the welfare gains.
It would be interesting to evaluate the empirical properties of this class of HA models both with
boostrapping methodologies, and with full-ﬂedged structural estimation ones. I leave these extensions
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Figure 8: Welfare Gains, Experiment 2b
26Sample Size Min Max Mean Med C.v.
π (e￿,e) (DGP=.9182)
1k .8545 .9583 .9169 .9181 .0189
4k .8764 .9396 .9176 .9182 .0104
16k .9022 .9319 .9183 .9183 .0051
64k .9113 .9244 .9184 .9185 .0025
π (e￿,u) (DGP=.7879)
1k .5137 1 .7968 .7897 .1271
4k .6329 1 .7909 .7892 .0730
16k .7109 .8810 .7874 .7879 .0361
64k .7525 .8355 .7870 .7865 .0173
Table 1: Calibration - "Simulated" Parameters: Descriptive Statistics
27Parameter Value Target
Model Period Half year
σ - CRRA 1.5 {1.0,2.0} Micro Estimates
b - Borrowing limit 4 {2,0} Two {one, zero} period income
δ - Capital depreciation rate 0.04 Investment share of output ≈ 22.5%
α - Capital share 0.34 Capital share of output = 34%
β - Rate of time preference 0.97979 Interest rate ≈ 4% (annual)
Table 2: Calibration - Fixed Parameters
28Parameter Value Policy
φ 0.5 UI replacement rate
G 0.42 Government Expenditure (20% of initial S.S. Output)
(G/Y ) 0.2 Government Expenditure (Fixed at 20% of S.S. Output)
τa 0.3 Capital income tax
Table 3: Policy Parameters
29Welfare Change (%) Min Max Mean Med C.v.
Experiment 1a (true=0.556)
1k 0.453 0.629 0.551 0.552 0.052
4k 0.479 0.604 0.554 0.554 0.035
16k 0.509 0.600 0.555 0.556 0.031
64k 0.508 0.594 0.555 0.556 0.030
Experiment 1b (true=0.370)
1k 0.308 0.418 0.364 0.364 0.054
4k 0.310 0.419 0.368 0.368 0.048
16k 0.328 0.410 0.369 0.368 0.044
64k 0.334 0.410 0.369 0.369 0.042
Experiment 2a (true=8.415)
1k 7.043 11.668 8.426 8.364 0.076
4k 7.497 9.862 8.425 8.390 0.039
16k 7.910 8.894 8.407 8.403 0.021
64k 8.138 8.704 8.397 8.396 0.012
Experiment 2b (true=3.645)
1k 3.185 4.326 3.645 3.645 0.049
4k 3.360 4.013 3.646 3.640 0.027
16k 3.429 3.877 3.647 3.644 0.020
64k 3.507 3.796 3.644 3.643 0.016
Table 4: Monte Carlo Results - Welfare Eﬀects
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32Appendix A - The Model and its Recursive Representation
6 Stationary Equilibrium
First the problem of employed and unemployed workers is deﬁned. The individual state variables
are the employment status s ∈ S = {e,u}, and asset holdings a ∈ A = [−b,a].19 The stationary
distribution of employed agents is denoted by µe(a) whereas the distribution of unemployed agents is
µu(a).
6.1 Problem of the agents
In this Section ﬁrst the problem of the agents in their recursive representation is deﬁned, then I
provide a formal deﬁnition of the equilibrium concept used in this model, the recursive competitive
equilibrium.
6.1.1 Problem of the unemployed workers
The value function of an unemployed agent whose current asset holdings are equal to a is denoted
with Vu (a). The problem of these agents can be represented as follows:
Vu (a) = max
c,a￿ {u(c) + β [π(u￿,u)Vu (a￿) + (1 − π(u￿,u))Ve (a￿)]} (5)
s.t.
c + a￿ = [1 + (1 − τa)r]a + (1 − τw)φw
a0 given, c ≥ 0, a￿ > −b
Unemployed agents have to set optimally their consumption/savings plans. They enjoy utility from
consumption, and face some uncertain events in the future. In the next period they can still be
unemployed, with probability π(u￿,u), or they can ﬁnd a job and enjoy an employment spell, with
probability 1 − π (u￿,u).
While unemployed these workers receive an unemployment beneﬁt equal to φw. The unemployment
beneﬁt consists of the replacement rate φ (a policy parameter) of the wage w an employed worker is
19A formal argument proving that a < ∞ appears for a similar economy in Huggett (1993).
33receiving. These agents pay both proportional labor and capital income taxes, τa and τw, respectively.
Finally, they are subject to an exogenous borrowing constraint, b ≥ 0.
6.1.2 Problem of the employed workers
The recursive representation of the problem of an employed worker is as follows:
Ve (a) = max
c,a￿ {u(c) + β [π(u￿,e)Vu (a￿) + (1 − π(u￿,e))Ve (a￿)]} (6)
s.t.
c + a￿ = [1 + (1 − τa)r]a + (1 − τw − τu)w
a0 given, c ≥ 0, a￿ > −b
Employed agents enjoy utility from consumption and face some uncertain events in the future.
In the next period they can still be employed, or they can experience a job separation and begin an
unemployment spell. Finally, notice that these agents pay labor and capital income taxes, together
with τu, which stands for an additional proportional labor income tax paid by the agents currently
employed to ﬁnance the unemployment beneﬁt scheme.
6.2 Recursive Stationary Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1 For given policies {τa,G,φ} a recursive stationary equilibrium is a set of decision rules
{ce(a),cu(a),a￿
e(a),a￿
u(a)}, value functions {Ve (a),Vu (a)}, prices {r,w}, proportional taxes {τu,τw}
and a set of stationary distributions {µe(a),µu(a)} such that:
• Given relative prices {r,w}, proportional taxes {τa,τu,τw} and unemployment beneﬁts φw, the
individual policy functions {ce(a),cu(a),a￿
e(a),a￿
u(a)} solve the household problems (5)-(6), and
{Ve (a),Vu (a)} are the associated value functions.
• Given relative prices {r,w}, K/L solves the ﬁrm’s problem and satisﬁes (1)-(2).
• The labor market is in ﬂow equilibrium, that is the measure of people becoming unemployed is
identical to the measure of people ﬁnding a job
￿
A










• The goods market clears
F (K,L) = C + I + G =
￿
A×S
cs(a)dµs(a) + δK + G










• The government’s budget is balanced, that is tax revenues from (capital and labor) income

















































= constant, case 2b



















In equilibrium the measure of agents in each state is time invariant and consistent with individual
decisions, as given by the above two equations (9)-(10).
• The welfare measures W, We and Wu are utilitarian, i.e. they weight agents’ utilities by their











35• The consumption based welfare measure ￿ ρ is the percentage increase in consumption in all states
of the world that makes welfare in the counterfactual economy W1 (ρ) equal to welfare in the
baseline one W0


































36Appendix B - Computation
• All codes solving the economies and simulating samples of agents were written in the FORTRAN
95 language, relying on the Intel Fortran Compiler, build 11.1.048 (with the IMSL library). They
were compiled selecting the O3 option (maximize speed), and without automatic parallelization.
They were run on a 64-bit PC platform, running Windows 7 Professional Edition, with an Intel
i7-870 Quad Core 2.93 Ghz processor.
• The 500 Monte Carlo replications take up to 100 hours to complete. Notice that 1,000 equilibria
have to be computed, and typically from 10 to 14 iterations on the interest rate are needed to
ﬁnd each equilibrium.
• The sample simulations are performed outside the numerical solution of the model. I simulate
for 500 times and for 3,000 periods (to ensure stationarity) a sample of individuals from the true
stochastic process. These simulations take from 5 minutes (with 1,000 individuals) to 5 hours
(with 64,000 ones). For a given sample size, in order to avoid sampling variability aﬀecting the
results, I rely on the same sample realizations to parameterize and solve all models.
• In the actual solution of the model I need to discretize the continuous state variable a (the
employment status is already discrete). I rely on an unevenly spaced grid, with the distance
between two consecutive points increasing geometrically. This is done to allow for a high precision
of the policy rules at low values of a, where the change in curvature is more pronounced.
• The model is solved with a time iteration procedure on the set of euler equations. In order
to allow for very good approximations of the policy functions, I use 2,001 grid points on the
asset space, the lowest value being the borrowing constraint b and the highest one being a value
amax > a high enough for the saving functions to cut the 45 degree line (amax = 2,200 for the
half year model). Notice that I do not restrict agents’ asset holdings to belong to a discrete set.
As for the approximation method, I rely on a linear approximation scheme for the saving and
consumption functions, for values of a falling outside the grid.
• A collocation method is implemented. I look for the policy functions such that the residuals of
the Euler equations are (close to) zero at the collocation points (the asset grid points). For all
possible combinations of state variables I need to solve a non linear equation. A time iteration
scheme is applied to get the policy functions, i.e. the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to a￿ and
the envelope condition deliver a set of euler equations, whose unknowns are the policy functions:
a￿
e(a), and a￿
u(a). I start from a set of guesses, a￿
e(a)0, and a￿
u(a)0, and keep on iterating until a










Typically, around 900 iterations are needed to reach a ﬁxed point.
• The stationary distributions are computed relying on their deﬁnitions (9)-(10). I start from a set




|µe(a)n+1 − µe(a)n| < 10−10 and Sup
a
|µu(a)n+1 − µu(a)n| < 10−10
Between 10,000 and 140,000 iterations are needed to reach a ﬁxed point. Between grid-points,
I use a linear approximation scheme.
• The asset market is in equilibrium when the current guess for the interest rate r0 achieves a
capital excess demand which is less than 0.1% of the market size. In turn, this implies that
the excess demand in the ﬁnal good market is always less than 0.1% of the market size. This
tolerance level could seem a minor aspect of the analysis. However, it is quite important. It
was found that, for the policies with a quantitatively small true welfare eﬀect, relying on a loose
criterion convergence was preventing the distribution of welfare eﬀects to display convergence
when increasing the sample size.
• The value functions are computed relying on the Bellman equations (5)-(6). I start from a set of
guesses, Ve(a)0, and Vu(a)0 and by using the optimal consumption and saving functions already
obtained I keep on iterating until convergence, i.e. until two successive iterations satisfy:
Sup
a
|Ve(a)n+1 − Ve(a)n| < 10−10 and Sup
a
|Vu(a)n+1 − Vu(a)n| < 10−10
Typically, around 1,150 iterations are needed to reach a ﬁxed point.
• The welfare measures W, We and Wu are just the numerical integral of the value functions,
integrated with respect to the steady state distributions. For more details, see Rios-Rull (1999).
• All convergence criteria are quite strict, and more stringent than what is normally used for these
models. However, they are needed in order to avoid numerical errors systematically biasing the
computation of the equilibria and their associated welfare measures. Some experimentation
showed that, for example, asset grids with less than 1,001 points lead to welfare eﬀects that
diﬀered in a non trivial way from the true ones, when these were less than 1%. The same
comment applies to virtually all other convergence criteria. The required level of precision,
however, drastically impacts the computational time.
38Appendix C - Monte Carlo Algorithm
The computational procedure used to solve the Monte Carlo experiments can be represented by
the following algorithm:
1. Simulate 500 times a sample of individuals of given size n and compute two statistics: the
average unemployment rate and the average unemployment duration; store them.
2. Read the two simulated moments and match them exactly with the markov chain probabilities.
3. Generate a discrete grid over the asset space [−b,...,amax].
4. Start the loop for the benchmark economy.
5. Get the employment level L.
6. Set the capital tax τa.
7. Guess the interest rate r0.
8. Get the capital demand K0, wages w0, and unemployment beneﬁts φw0.
9. Get the equilibrium taxes τu,τw.
10. Get the saving functions a￿
e(a),a￿
u(a).
11. Get the stationary distributions µe(a),µu(a).
12. Get the aggregate capital supply.
13. Check asset market clearing; Get r1.
14. Update r￿
0 (with a bi-section method).
15. Iterate until asset market clearing.
16. Get the consumption functions c￿
e(a),c￿
u(a).
17. Check ﬁnal good market clearing.
18. Compute the equilibrium value functions Ve(a),Vu(a) and the ex-ante welfare W,We and Wu.
19. Start the loop for the counterfactual economy (i.e. under the new policy regime) and repeat
steps 5 − 18.
20. Save the output and repeat from step 2 for 500 times.
39Appendix D - Additional Results and Figures
Welfare Change Employed (%) Min Max Mean Med C.v.
Experiment 1a (true=0.667)
1k 0.515 0.776 0.660 0.662 0.068
4k 0.554 0.735 0.664 0.664 0.040
16k 0.616 0.720 0.665 0.665 0.029
64k 0.615 0.709 0.666 0.666 0.026
Experiment 1b (true=0.478)
1k 0.372 0.558 0.472 0.475 0.070
4k 0.385 0.548 0.477 0.477 0.049
16k 0.429 0.526 0.478 0.478 0.036
64k 0.439 0.526 0.478 0.478 0.033
Experiment 2a (true=8.363)
1k 6.998 11.597 8.375 8.315 0.077
4k 7.451 9.812 8.374 8.340 0.039
16k 7.858 8.839 8.356 8.349 0.021
64k 8.086 8.651 8.346 8.344 0.012
Experiment 2b (true=3.619)
1k 3.169 4.298 3.620 3.619 0.049
4k 3.334 3.981 3.620 3.611 0.027
16k 3.406 3.852 3.621 3.618 0.020
64k 3.478 3.770 3.618 3.617 0.016
Table 5: Monte Carlo Results - Welfare Eﬀects for the Employed
40Welfare Change Unemployed (%) Min Max Mean Med C.v.
Experiment 1a (true=−0.528)
1k −1.555 −0.111 −0.542 −0.527 0.083
4k −0.987 −0.159 −0.533 −0.525 0.050
16k −0.721 −0.332 −0.533 −0.528 0.036
64k −0.619 −0.408 −0.532 −0.531 0.032
Experiment 1b (true=−0.699)
1k −1.746 −0.294 −0.715 −0.695 0.342
4k −1.156 −0.317 −0.704 −0.696 0.192
16k −0.903 −0.493 −0.703 −0.699 0.100
64k −0.801 −0.607 −0.702 −0.702 0.052
Experiment 2a (true=8.939)
1k 7.609 12.178 8.950 8.893 0.070
4k 8.060 10.279 8.950 8.917 0.036
16k 8.464 9.419 8.932 8.932 0.019
64k 8.662 9.222 8.921 8.920 0.011
Experiment 2b (true=3.909)
1k 3.395 4.526 3.911 3.916 0.044
4k 3.640 4.295 3.911 3.906 0.024
16k 3.681 4.117 3.911 3.910 0.018
64k 3.755 4.060 3.908 3.909 0.015
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Figure 18: Welfare Gains Unemployed, Experiment 2b
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